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CRIMINALIZING WAR: TOWARD A 
JUSTIFIABLE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
Michael O’Donovan* 
Abstract: State parties to the International Criminal Court made history 
in 1998 when they agreed to include the crime of aggression as one of 
four crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The crime, however, 
was left undefined in 1998, and the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression has been postponed until state parties can agree to a defi-
nition at a Review Conference in 2009. Reaching such an agreement 
would represent the first time in history that national leaders would be 
bound by a specifically defined crime of international aggression with 
sanctions wielded by an international court. Parties to the Court, how-
ever, differ widely over two questions: whether the crime should be de-
fined narrowly or broadly, and who should decide when aggression has 
occurred, thus triggering the Court’s jurisdiction over the culpable in-
dividuals. The two questions have largely split state parties between 
those citing the demands of the current international system and those 
committed to basic principles of fairness. This Note suggests that by ap-
plying the traditional utilitarian and retributivist rationales for the 
criminal law, state parties may be able to reach the most balanced and 
principled definition of aggression. 
Introduction 
 In July 1998 a United Nations (U.N.) Conference in Rome negoti-
ated and adopted a treaty that set up the world’s first International 
Criminal Court (ICC).1 State delegations in Rome settled on four 
crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the new court: “War Crimes,” 
“Crimes Against Humanity,” “Genocide,” and “Aggression.”2 The inclu-
sion of the first three crimes was undisputed.3 The crime of aggression, 
                                                                                                                      
* Michael O’Donovan is a Production Editor for the International & Comparative Law 
Review. The author earned his M.Sc. from the London School of Economics and his B.A. 
from New York University. 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 
[hereinafter Rome Treaty]. 
2 See id., arts. 5–8; see also Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Ju-
risdiction of the Court, in The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome 
Statute 79, 79 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). 
3 von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 81. 
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however, was highly controversial,4 and remains divisive today.5 Unlike 
the first three crimes, the crime of aggression implicates not only indi-
vidual responsibility, but state responsibility as well.6 The Court would 
seemingly intrude on the province of the U.N. and the Security Coun-
cil if it were to identify and prosecute instances of state aggression.7 
And unlike the other crimes, which describe brutal acts of violence, 
aggression is a more subjective and circumstantial crime, highly de-
pendent on perspective, and invoking the most sensitive questions of 
defense and international security.8 
 Faced with these inherent differences, states in Rome faced two 
related problems: (1) how to define the prohibited acts with sufficient 
clarity; and (2) who would judge whether aggression had occurred, 
thus “triggering” the Court’s jurisdiction over individual liability.9 While 
these conceptual difficulties gave rise to calls for excluding the crime 
from the Court’s jurisdiction,10 many smaller states insisted on its inclu-
sion.11 In the end, states agreed to a compromise: the Statute of the 
Court would include the crime of aggression, but the Court’s jurisdic-
tion over the crime would be suspended until states could agree on a 
definition and on how the jurisdiction of the Court would be trig-
gered.12 Member States created a working group on the crime of ag-
gression that would work toward a resolution,13 and deferred the con-
troversy until a Review Conference would convene to discuss amend-
ments to the Statute seven years after it took effect.14 The Working 
Group has since expressed the goal of offering a unified proposal by 
                                                                                                                      
4 Id. 
5 See International Criminal Court (ICC), Official Records of the Assembly of States 
Parties, Fourth Session, Annex II.A, para. 63, ICC-ASP/4/32 (2005)[hereinafter Docu-
ments of the Fourth Session]. 
6 Theodor Meron, Defining Aggression for the International Criminal Court, 25 Suffolk 
Transnat’l L. Rev. 1, 3 (2001). 
7 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Can Aggression Be Deterred By Law?, 11 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 
341, 356 (1999). 
8 See Meron, supra note 6, at 3. 
9 See Ferencz, supra note 7, at 351; von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 82. 
10 See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 82. 
11 Ferencz, supra note 7, at 351; Andreas L. Paulus, Peace Through Justice? The Future of 
the Crime of Aggression in a Time of Crisis, 50 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 20 (2004). 
12 See Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5(2); see also Meron, supra note 6, at 2; Paulus, su-
pra note 11, at 21. 
13 Jennifer Trahan, Defining “Aggression”: Why the Preparatory Commission for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court Has Faced Such a Conundrum, 24 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 439, 
446–47 (2002). 
14 See Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 123. 
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2008.15 And while the Working Group has produced thoughtful com-
mentary and identified discrete options, its reports demonstrate the 
same competing commitments to principle and pragmatism that pro-
duced the stalemate in Rome.16 
 The effort to define aggression is important.17 Despite the best ef-
forts of its detractors, the ICC has become a relevant and useful force in 
the international community.18 While observers note the possibility of 
excluding the crime of aggression and using the other crimes to prose-
cute war criminals,19 the failure to include the crime of aggression 
would represent a significant regression in the rule of international 
law.20 Criminalizing aggression satisfies a universal need to affirm our 
shared values, deter unjustified conflict, and punish the criminal who 
disrupts peaceful lives through violence or the threat of violence.21 
Criminalizing aggression is not merely an academic exercise; it is a sig-
nificant expression of humanity’s rejection of war as statecraft, and po-
tentially an important step towards a more just and peaceful interna-
tional order.22 
 In order to move beyond the current debate and towards a prin-
cipled, fully justifiable crime of aggression, the Working Group should 
utilize the traditional analytic frameworks for domestic criminal law.23 
Like domestic crimes, international criminal laws should accord with 
utilitarian and retributivist rationales to the greatest extent possible.24 
The failure to justify the crime of aggression in accord with these phi-
losophical frameworks will render a definition assailable by critics as 
                                                                                                                      
15 See id.; Documents of the Fourth Session, supra note 5, para. 90. 
16 See, e.g., Documents of the Fourth Session, supra note 5, paras. 66–68. 
17 See Meron, supra note 6, at 3; Trahan, supra note 13, at 442. 
18 See Elizabeth Rubin, If Not Peace, Then Justice, N.Y. Times Magazine, Apr. 2, 2006, at 
42. 
19 See Grant M. Dawson, Defining Substantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court: What Is the Crime of Aggression?, 19 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 413, 446 (2000). 
20 See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 82. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
held individuals responsible for crimes against peace more than 50 years ago. Id.; see also 
Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction: Report of Ricardo J. Alfaro, U.N. Int’l Law 
Comm., para. 86, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/15 and Corr.1 (1950), available at http://untreaty.un. 
org/ilc/documentation/english/ a_cn4_15.pdf [hereinafter Alfaro]. 
21 See Ferencz, supra note 7, at 358. 
22 See id.; Meron, supra note 6, at 3. 
23 See Kent Greenawalt, Commentary: Punishment, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 343, 
359 (1983). 
24 See George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 
687, 698–699 (2000). 
510 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 30:507 
unjust or ineffective.25 By applying these traditional philosophies of 
penal law, the Working Group will be able to formulate the most justi-
fiable and rigorous solution possible. 26 
 Part I of this Note will trace the history of the concept of aggres-
sion and the negotiating history of the crime of aggression. Part II will 
discuss the contributions of the Working Group and the important 
considerations of Member States. Part III will apply the traditional 
utilitarian and retributivist rationales in order to suggest specific ap-
proaches that are most consistent with the goals and purposes of the 
law. 
I. Background 
 While war traditionally was viewed as a legitimate extension of 
statecraft— “political intercourse, carried on with other means,” in 
the words of Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz27— 
World War I served to crystallize the notion that the aggressive acts of 
one state against another were not just unlawful but criminal.28 As 
early as 1919, the Treaty of Versailles contemplated measures to try 
Kaiser Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern in a court of law for “a supreme 
offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”29 
While the Kaiser won refuge in the Netherlands from the allied tribu-
nal, the effort clearly asserted the principle that crimes against peace 
should be punished, and that international tribunals could exercise 
jurisdiction over such crimes.30 Indeed, while rejecting the allied re-
quest for extradition based on the ad hoc character of the proposed 
tribunal, the Netherlands added: 
If in the future there should be instituted by the society of 
nations an international jurisdiction, competent to judge in 
case of war deeds qualified as crimes and submitted to its ju-
risdiction by statute antedating the acts committed, it would 
be fit for Holland to associate herself with the new regime.31 
                                                                                                                      
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 Carl von Clausewitz, On War 87 (Michael E. Howard & Peter Perret trans., 
1976); see also Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law, ch. 56 (B.D.W. Hastie trans. 
2002). 
28 See Alfaro, supra note 20, para. 6. 
29 Id. para. 8. 
30 Id. para. 12. 
31 Paulus, supra note 11, at 9. 
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 This insistence on a criminal code and permanent court were 
echoed by the architects of the League of Nations and the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1920.32 While the advisory 
committee tasked with creating the new world court decided that a 
criminal jurisdiction posed unnecessary obstacles to the new PCIJ—a 
court established to judge the affairs of nations and not of individuals— 
the committee did not rule out the possibility of creating a separate 
branch of the court in the future to deal with criminal jurisdiction.33 
Those who opposed including a criminal branch of the PCIJ at that 
early stage noted the absence of any international penal law, and the 
violation of the principle nulla poena sine lege (no punishment without 
law).34 
 Efforts to outlaw wars of aggression continued throughout the 
early years of the League of Nations, and culminated in the expres-
sion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.35 The United States, France, 
and the other major powers of the day concluded that the “time has 
come [for] a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national 
policy . . . .”36 However, the international community failed to erect 
any enforcement mechanism over the ambitious agreement, and it 
came to be seen as little more than hortatory rhetoric.37 
 The principle of a universal criminal jurisdiction over interna-
tional crimes was again advanced in 1937 when states negotiated a 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism.38 The 
Convention was accompanied by a Protocol to establish an interna-
tional criminal court with the specific and limited jurisdiction over 
the alleged terrorists, but neither the Convention nor the Protocol 
ever garnered sufficient support to enter into force.39 
A. Nuremburg 
 In January 1942, in the midst of World War II, nine Allied gov-
ernments met in London to condemn the atrocities of the Axis ag-
                                                                                                                      
32 See Alfaro, supra note 20, paras. 14–17. 
33 See id. para. 16. 
34 Id. para. 17. 
35 The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 
L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. 
38 Alfaro, supra note 20, para. 26. 
39 Id.; see also Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal 
That Overcomes Past Objections, 23 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 419, 424 (1995). 
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gressors.40 The result of the meeting was the Inter Allied Declaration 
on Punishment of War Crimes, or the St. James Declaration, in which 
the Allies declared their aim to punish those responsible for war 
crimes “through the channel of organized justice.”41 The document 
cites the need to punish in order to avoid acts of vengeance commit-
ted by the general public “and in order to satisfy the sense of justice of 
the civilised world.”42 Lord Simon later added “we shall never do any 
good to our own standards, to our own reputation and to the ultimate 
reform of the world if what we do is not reasonably consistent with 
justice . . . .”43 
 In August 1945, following the cessation of hostilities, the govern-
ments of the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Un-
ion, gathered in London to write a Charter establishing an Interna-
tional Military Tribunal (IMT) to try war criminals of the European 
Axis.44 The London Charter defined the crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal as “crimes against the peace,” “war crimes,” and “crimes 
against humanity.”45 Justice Robert Jackson of the U.S. Supreme Court 
served as the Chief Prosecutor for the Tribunal before four judges rep-
resenting each of the four Allied powers.46 The Charter defined 
“crimes against peace” simply as “planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international 
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan 
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”47 Thus, 
without any separate definition of what constituted a “war of aggres-
sion,” the Charter simply defined one vague concept—crimes against 
peace—by reference to another—a war of aggression.48 
 Critics of the tribunal also pointed to four primary flaws: the tri-
bunal was of an ad hoc nature, and not permanent; it was more politi-
cal than juridical; the judges were appointed by the four allies and 
were not representative of the international community; and the 
                                                                                                                      
40 Alfaro, supra note 20, para. 31. 
41 Id. para. 32. 
42 Id. para. 31. 
43 Id. para. 34. These justifications offer a number of retributivist, utilitarian, and ex-
pressive rationales. See id. 
44 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279. 
45 Id. art. 6. 
46 Id. art. 2; see Ferencz, supra note 7, at 344. 
47 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 44, art. 6(a). 
48 See Paulus, supra note 11, at 13. Justice Jackson conceded, “it is perhaps a weakness 
in this Charter that it fails itself to define a war of aggression.” Id. at 13–14. 
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charter was said to have disregarded the principle of nullem crimen 
nulla poena sine lege (there is no crime, nor punishment, without a 
law).49 In response to the last, and most serous criticism,50 the tribu-
nal countered that wars of aggression were already illegal and a crime 
under customary law.51 Whether or not the Charter reflected the state 
of customary law in 1945, the judgments of the IMT have since be-
come enshrined in international law, supporting a new—or at least 
more explicit—norm against international aggression.52 
 While the tribunal at Nuremberg, and the later tribunal estab-
lished by General McArthur for the Far East,53 represented the first 
actual international trials of individuals as war criminals—a huge in-
novation in international law—Jackson remained convinced that the 
greatest achievement of the tribunals was the condemnation of ag-
gressive war itself.54 Indeed, the “crimes against peace” articulated in 
the Charter and the judgments of the Nuremberg Tribunal were 
unanimously affirmed by the General Assembly of the new United 
Nations in 1946.55 Cognizant, however, of the strict view that the Lon-
don Charter had defined its crimes after the fact, and thus violated 
the principle of nullem crimen sine lege, the U.N. directed the prepara-
tion of a formalized code of international crimes and a statute for a 
new international criminal tribunal.56 These efforts, however, proved 
difficult as the rapid dissolution of international unity after World 
War II gave way to the outright hostility of the Cold War.57 The per-
ceived primacy of national security dramatically slowed the develop-
ment of both the court and the codification of any criminal code.58 
                                                                                                                      
49 Alfaro, supra note 20, para. 39. 
50 Id. para. 103. 
51 Preparatory Comm. of the Int’l Crim. Court, Working Group on the Crime of Aggres-
sion, Historical Review of Developments relating to Aggression, paras. 56–57, PCNICC/2002/ 
WGCA/L.1, Jan. 24, 2002 [hereinafter Historical Review]; see also Meron, supra note 6, at 345–
46. 
52 See Meron, supra note 6, at 6; see also Alfaro, supra note 20, para. 105; Paulus, supra 
note 11, at 3–4. 
53 Alfaro, supra note 20, para. 41. The Far East Tribunal, established by General 
McArthur, included judges representing eleven nationalities. Id. It functioned in a manner 
and under principles almost identical with those of the Nuremberg tribunal. Id. 
54 See Ferencz, supra note 7, at 346. 
55 G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 188, U.N. Doc A/Res/95 (Dec. 11, 1946); 
Ferencz, supra note 7, at 346–47. 
56 G.A. Res. 95(I), supra note 55, at 188; see also Alfaro, supra note 20, para 43; Ferencz, 
supra note 7, at 346–7. 
57 See Dawson, supra note 19, at 415; Ferencz, supra note 7, at 347; Paulus, supra note 
11, at 14. 
58 See Dawson, supra note 19, at 415; Paulus, supra note 11, at 14. 
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B. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 
 While progress during the Cold War was slow, the U.N. reached a 
consensus definition of aggression with the unanimous passage of Reso-
lution 3314 in 1974.59 Under Article 24 of the U.N. Charter, the Secu-
rity Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining global peace 
and security by countering acts of aggression;60 but the Charter does 
not define that term and the Security Council has been free to make 
such declarations without referencing any objective criteria.61 There-
fore, the definition contained in U.N. Resolution 3314 was formulated 
ostensibly to guide the Security Council in its determinations of when 
aggression had occurred.62 The Resolution, non-binding in itself, con-
demned the use of armed force by a state against the sovereign territo-
rial integrity or political independence of another state.63 The defini-
tion then goes on to list a series of acts that qualify as acts of aggres-
sion.64 The list of acts, however, is described as non-exhaustive and the 
General Assembly made clear that the Security Council may determine 
that other acts also constitute aggression,65 or that acts technically fal-
ling within the description of aggression might be justified under the 
circumstances of the case.66 The Resolution passed unanimously, but 
has since been largely ignored by the Security Council, which has gen-
erally avoided using the term.67 Observers note that the Council has 
been reluctant to alienate one party to a conflict by identifying an act of 
state as aggression, preferring instead to note threats or breaches of the 
peace.68 
                                                                                                                      
59 G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Definition of Aggression, Annex, Definition 
of Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/Res./3314 (XXIX)(1974)[hereinafter Res. 3314]; see also Fer-
encz, supra note 7, at 347. 
60 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. Art. 24(1) reads, “In order to ensure prompt and ef-
fective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in 
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.” 
Id. 
61 See Historical Review, supra note 51, paras. 379–429 (describing declarations of ag-
gression by the U.N. Security Council). 
62 See Meron, supra note 6, at 7. 
63 See Ferencz, supra note 7, at 347, 354–55. 
64 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 59, art. 3. 
65 Id. art 4. 
66 Id. art. 2. 
67 See Paulus, supra note 11, at 17. 
68 Id. 
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C. The Rome Conference 
 The idea of an international criminal court was revived in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, in part as a means to combat terrorism and 
transnational drug crimes.69 The International Law Commission of the 
U.N. (ILC) was tasked by the Security Council with setting up the 
court70 and issued a Draft Statute for a court in 199471 as well as a Draft 
Code of Crimes in 1996.72 Between 1996 and 1998 a U.N. Preparatory 
Committee refined the work of the ILC, and in June and July 1998 160 
state delegations met in Rome to finalize and adopt a convention.73 
 The ILC Draft Statute recognized two categories of crimes.74 The 
first category, core crimes, included genocide, violations of the laws of 
war, crimes against humanity, and aggression.75 The second category 
was made up of treaty crimes, such as torture, drug crimes, and certain 
acts of terrorism.76 But from the beginning of negotiations, states ex-
pressed a preference for limiting the jurisdiction of the Court to core 
crimes.77 It was hoped that limiting the jurisdiction to those crimes that 
were customary would promote the widest acceptance and greatest 
credibility for the court.78 However, the inclusion of the crime of ag-
gression remained controversial at Rome until the end of the confer-
ence.79 Three distinct questions separated the views of the state parties: 
whether the crime should be included at all; what was the proper role 
of the Security Council with respect to identifying instances of aggres-
sion; and how to define the crime so as to satisfy the principle of nullem 
crimen sine lege.80 
 With regard to the role of the Security Council, the ILC had rec-
ommended in its draft statute that the Security Council must first de-
clare an act of aggression before the Court could take jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                                      
69 See Roy S. Lee, Introduction: The Rome Conference and Its Contributions to International 
Law, in The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute 1, 2 
(Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); William J. vanden Heuvel & Russell M. Dallen Jr., A First Step Toward 
an International Criminal Court, Christian Science Monitor, July 8, 1992, at 23. 
70 Time for a Global General Court, N.Y. Times, Opinion, Nov. 21, 1994, at A14. 
71 Lee, supra note 69, at 3. 
72 Id. at 3, n.5. 
73 Id. at 4, 36. 
74 von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 80. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 81; see Meron, supra note 6, at 1. 
80 von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 81–82; see also Alfaro, supra note 20, para. 39. 
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the crime.81 This provision was included for the sake of securing the 
broadest possible participation82 and based on the primary role of the 
Security Council in identifying acts of aggression as expressed in Art. 39 
of the U.N. Charter.83 The proposed court was thus limited to deter-
mining individual responsibility for the crime, and shielded from the 
politically sensitive determination of when international aggression had 
taken place.84 This approach was supported strongly by the permanent 
members of the Security Council.85 Critics however, argued that this 
gave too much power to the Council.86 By wielding their veto power 
over disfavored determinations, the permanent members of the Coun-
cil would be able to commit the crime with impunity or shield allies 
from the reach of the Court.87 
 With respect to the problem of definition, three approaches were 
considered.88 The first was to provide a generic definition that would 
define state aggression.89 The second was to produce a general defini-
tion in combination with a list of acts representing aggression, such as 
Resolution 3314.90 The third approach was not to define aggression at 
all, leaving the determination to the Security Council.91 During the 
Rome conference states expressed concerns that a narrow definition 
would prove too restrictive,92 while a broad approach could be abused 
for political purposes and jeopardize the independence of the 
court.93 
 Opponents of including the crime suggested that these concep-
tual difficulties posed insurmountable obstacles for the Conference in 
Rome.94 Others, however, argued that excluding the crime of aggres-
sion would represent a significant step backwards, since the Nurem-
berg and Tokyo Tribunals had prosecuted criminals for the same 
                                                                                                                      
81 von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 82. 
82 Paulus, supra note 11, at 20. 
83 See U.N. Charter art. 39. Art. 39 reads, “The Security Council shall determine the ex-
istence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Id. 
84 See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 82; see also Meron, supra note 6, at 13. 
85 von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 82. 
86 See Paulus, supra note 11, at 20, 21. 
87 Id. at 21–22; see Dawson, supra note 19, at 440. 
88 von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 82. 
89 Trahan, supra note 13, at 449; von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 82. 
90 Trahan, supra note 13, at 449; von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 82. 
91 Trahan, supra note 13, at 449; von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 82. 
92 von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 84. 
93 Id. at 83. 
94 See id. at 82. 
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crime fifty years earlier.95 Advocates for including the crime of aggres-
sion took a hard line in negotiations, but it became increasingly clear 
that states would not be able to agree on a definition of the crime or 
how the court’s jurisdiction would be “triggered.”96 The non-aligned 
movement eventually proposed a compromise that would include the 
crime but leave the definition to a later stage.97 Thus the current Stat-
ute includes the crime in the jurisdiction of the Court, but suspends 
that jurisdiction until state-parties can resolve the outstanding issues.98 
The Statute makes clear that the definition must be consistent with 
the provisions of the U.N. Charter and be adopted in accordance with 
articles 121 and 123 of the Statute, which direct a Review Conference 
and amendment procedure seven years after the Statute enters into 
force. 99 
 Following the successful negotiation and passage of the Rome 
Charter in 1998, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) charged a Pre-
paratory Commission with fleshing out remaining issues, such as rules 
of procedure and the definition of aggression.100 While the Commis-
sion was not able to reach an agreement on the crime before the Court 
took effect, it did offer a useful discussion paper in July 2002 offering 
options to both define the crime and trigger the jurisdiction of the 
Court.101 The Commission also created a Working Group on the Crime 
of Aggression to continue to elaborate on these proposals with the aim 
of reaching a consensus at a future Review Conference.102 Since that 
time, the Working Group has debated elements of the crime, issuing 
the latest report on its progress in June 2005.103 
                                                                                                                      
95 Id. at 82; see also Dawson, supra note 19, at 446–47. 
96 Ferencz, supra note 7, at 350–51; von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 85. 
97 See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 85. 
98 Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5(2); von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 2, at 85. 
99 Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5(2). Art. 5(2) reads, “The Court shall exercise juris-
diction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with arti-
cles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court 
shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent 
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.” Id. 
100 Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Resolution F, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/10 
( July 17, 1998). 
101 See Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Proposals for a 
Provision on the Crime of Aggression, at 3, PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2 ( July 12, 2002) [hereinaf-
ter Discussion Paper]. 
102 Id. at 2; see also Trahan, supra note 13, at 446. 
103 Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Informal Inter-sessional 
Meeting, Annex II-A, ICC-ASP/4/32, Dec. 2005 [hereinafter Working Group Report]. 
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II. Discussion 
 The two main obstacles facing the Working Group have been the 
difficulty (a) defining the crime; and (b) “setting out the conditions 
under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to the 
crime.”104 This second issue is the more politically intractable of the 
two, pitting the presumed power and prerogative of the Security Coun-
cil against the principles of fairness and accountability.105 
A. Determining Aggression 
 The final compromise worked out in Rome clarified that the even-
tual definition of aggression would include the circumstances “under 
which the Court’s jurisdiction may be exercised” —i.e. how the Court’s 
jurisdiction would be “triggered.”106 While the Court may be competent 
to try individuals, determinations implicitly condemning an act of state 
were thought to be beyond the competence of the Court.107 Thus a 
prior determination of aggression by an external body should be made 
a precondition of the Court’s jurisdiction.108 Additionally, the Court’s 
Statute explicitly notes that any eventual provision must be consistent 
with the U.N. Charter.109 While it is clear that this refers to the role of 
the U.N. in “triggering” the jurisdiction of the Court, states have di-
vided widely on the appropriate relationship between the Court and 
the U.N.110 
 Some, echoing the ILC Draft Statute, suggest that the permanent 
members of the Council will insist on their presumed prerogative un-
der Articles 24 and 39 of the U.N. Charter, 111 and that in order to 
mitigate politicized accusations against the major powers and garner 
                                                                                                                      
104 Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5, para. 2; see also Trahan, supra note 13, at 447. 
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the support of those states, the Council should be given the exclusive 
ability to initiate a charge of aggression.112 
 Those arguing against exclusive competence of the Security 
Council point out that Article 24 confers only “primary” and not “ex-
clusive” competence on the Council.113 Providing exclusive compe-
tence would paralyze the Court if the Council proved unwilling or 
unable to address any dispute.114 Furthermore, exclusivity would per-
mit the permanent members of the Security Council115 to shield their 
nationals or allies from prosecution, thus resulting in a two-tiered 
administration of justice.116 Additionally, Art. 39 must be understood 
in the context of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which relates to the 
responsibility of the Council to maintain peace between states.117 The 
Council’s determination under Art. 39 is thus for the purpose of 
maintaining peace and security at a systemic level, and not for the 
purpose of assigning individual criminal responsibility.118 Finally, con-
cern has been expressed that a political determination would under-
mine the development of precedent and customary law.119 According 
to this argument, political determinations would destroy the credibil-
ity of the prosecution and provide little principled guidance for fu-
ture determinations.120 
 Some supporters of the Court suggest that the Court itself should 
make the determination that aggression has occurred.121 This option 
would seem to maximize the independence and power of the Court.122 
However, the option would also thrust the Court into delicate questions 
of international relations and invite charges of politicization, unac-
countability, and incompetence.123 The option was included in the dis-
cussion paper of the coordinator, but the Working Group appears to 
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have dismissed the idea, noting that the Security Council would seem 
to have some mandatory role under Article 39—though not necessarily 
an exclusive one.124 
 Alternatively, the failure of the Council to act on any matter may 
be seen to cede the issue to the General Assembly.125 The U.N. Charter 
gives the Assembly the right to consider any topic,126 and make any rec-
ommendation in the interests of peace,127 subject only to constraints 
when the Security Council is affirmatively acting on a matter128 or when 
an issue requires “action” by the Security Council.129 The determina-
tion of aggression may well be seen to fall within the Assembly’s powers 
of discussion and “recommendation.”130 
 Additionally, the General Assembly has previously asserted its 
power when the Security Council has proven unable to assume its re-
sponsibilities under the U.N. Charter.131 The Uniting for Peace Reso-
lution of 1950, expressly resolved that: 
[I]f the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the 
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsi-
bility for the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity in any case where there appears to be a threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General 
Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view 
to making appropriate recommendations to Members for 
collective measures . . . .132 
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 Since 1950, the General Assembly has acted under this power on 
a number of occasions thus providing the added authority of prece-
dent and customary law.133 
 Finally, the ICJ may also be held competent to trigger jurisdic-
tion.134 A determination made by a judicial organ would not be subject 
to the same critiques of overt politicization.135 The ICJ is an established 
court, representative of the international community and, as the “prin-
cipal judicial organ of the United Nations,” is indisputably competent 
to make such determinations.136 The ICJ has previously interpreted acts 
of aggression and proven sensitive to the critical question of self-
defense and justification.137 Thus, determinations would be most au-
thoritative if made by such a representative and competent judicial or-
gan.138 
 However, according to the U.N. Charter, either the General As-
sembly or the Security Council must request an ICJ advisory opinion.139 
Therefore, the jurisdiction of the ICJ must itself be “triggered” by a re-
quest from one of the other two bodies.140 Thus, the options available 
to the Working Group are: (a) a determination made exclusively by the 
Security Council; (b) a determination made by either the Council or 
the General Assembly; or (c) a “three power” approach including all 
the organs of the U.N.141 Providing for determinations from multiple 
bodies, however, has raised the concern over the risk of inconsistent 
determinations.142 
 A final issue concerns the effect of any pre-determination on the 
ICC.143 If the Security Council or the ICJ makes a determination that 
aggression has occurred, is it appropriate for the prosecutor to re-
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evaluate that judgment or merely to find the responsible individual?144 
A re-evaluation clearly risks the ICC coming to a different conclu-
sion.145 But a binding decision by any of the U.N. organs would appear 
to violate the rights of the accused and presume guilt instead of inno-
cence.146 
B. The Definition 
 The second controversy is how to define the act of aggression.147 
States have debated three basic approaches to define the act of ag-
gression.148 The first uses a generic definition that would define state 
aggression. 149 The second method is to adopt the approach of Reso-
lution 3314 and describe specific acts that constitute aggression.150 
The third approach does not define the act of aggression at all leaving 
the matter completely to the determination of the Security Council.151 
 The Coordinator’s discussion paper suggests that the crime of 
aggression is committed when a person: 
being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to di-
rect the political or military action of a State, that person in-
tentionally and knowingly orders or participates actively in the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of ag-
gression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a 
flagrant violation in the Charter of the United Nations.152 
 The discussion paper then provides three options for clarifying 
the proposal.153 The first option would add “such as, in particular, a 
war of aggression or an act which has the object or result of establish-
ing a military occupation of or annexing the territory of another State 
or part thereof.”154 The second option adds essentially the same provi-
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sion but substitutes “and amounts to” for “such as,” thereby strictly 
limiting the definition to cases of occupation or annexation.155 Op-
tion three is simply to leave the proposal as is.156 
 The discussion paper continues in paragraph two, stating that an 
act of aggression means an act referred to in UNGA Resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of December 14, 1974, which is determined to have been 
committed by the state concerned.157 The two options listed after para-
graph two both seek to clarify that another body—the Security Council 
or some combination of the Council, Assembly, and ICJ—must first 
make the determination that the crime has occurred.158 
 The discussion paper also outlines the elements of the crime 
separately, clarifying the mens rea, the leadership nature of the crime, 
and the required gravity of the aggression to qualify as a crime.159 
 Among the competing concerns at the Working Group are the 
degree of faithfulness to a “traditional” definition, such as the Nur-
emberg principles, and the ability to define the evolving nature of the 
crime.160 According to the former argument, the “core” crimes that 
were included in the Statute were customary crimes, the decision hav-
ing been made not to include “treaty crimes” within the jurisdiction of 
the new court.161 The definition of each concept should therefore re-
flect a traditional understanding of the crime.162 Others argue, how-
ever, that previous tribunals, such as Nuremberg, have been con-
cerned with completed acts of aggression, and therefore have not 
needed to think of the crime in a progressive or evolving way.163 Since 
the Rome Statute treats the other “customary” crimes, such as crimes 
against humanity, in an extraordinarily progressive fashion, it is ap-
propriate to advance the definition of aggression, including not only 
traditional forms of aggression, such as military occupation, but evolv-
ing methods as well.164 In its 2005 report, the Working Group notes 
simply that among its state delegations there exists a considerable 
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preference for a generic approach, motivated presumably by a desire 
to capture the evolving variations of the crime by would-be aggres-
sors.165 
III. Analysis 
 The act of punishing an individual for a violation of criminal law 
can be justified on a number of philosophical grounds.166 The two 
dominant rationales for a penal law are the desire for retribution and 
the utilitarian desire to prevent or deter such violations altogether.167 
Viewing the choices facing the Working Group from the perspective 
of these two rationales, it is possible to distinguish a principled and 
rigorous formulation for the crime of aggression.168 
 Retributivists such as Immanuel Kant have stressed the uncom-
promising demands of justice above all else.169 The guiding principle 
of this rationale is that the initial evil committed by the criminal must 
be turned on the actor.170 Thus, the retributivist emphasizes two cor-
responding requirements: society is under a duty to exact justice and 
the punishment must be proportional to the crime.171 The failure to 
punish the wrongdoer is a dereliction of duty that inculpates all of 
society.172 In the famous formulation of Kant: 
Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself . . . the last 
Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before 
the resolution was carried out. This ought to be done in or-
der that every one may realize the desert of his deeds, and 
that bloodguiltiness may not remain upon the people; for 
otherwise they might all be regarded as participators in the 
murder as a public violation of justice.173 
 According to this deontological view of crime and punishment, 
individuals guilty of the crime of aggression must be prosecuted in 
whichever State they may be found.174 Retributivists would have little 
patience for political impunity merely because the individual is the 
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national of one of the Permanent Members of the Security Council.175 
This consideration would seem to support a very liberal triggering 
mechanism that provides the widest possible jurisdiction.176 Failure to 
trigger the jurisdiction of the Court would inculpate the entire inter-
national system for allowing the crime to go unpunished.177 Thus a 
“three power” or “all powers” approach would best satisfy the need for 
certain prosecution.178 
 However, the retributivist will also insist that punishment must be 
deserved—the just desert of the wrong-doer.179 Political determina-
tions of aggression made by the Security Council or the General As-
sembly have the potential to be influenced by considerations of self-
interest, expediency, or jealousy.180 This increases the likelihood that 
individuals will be prosecuted and punished without ever having 
committed a crime—an inexcusable abuse to the retributivist.181 Thus, 
the relatively apolitical courts would seem the best choice to avoid 
undeserved prosecution.182 
 Utilitarians, however, such as Bentham and Mill, view punish-
ment not as a duty or the exaction of a debt, but as a means to pre-
vent future crimes.183 Individuals base their actions on whether it re-
sults in pain or pleasure and the chief end of society is to maximize 
the total happiness of the community.184 Since punishment and 
criminal trials are costly and reduce the overall happiness of society, 
they are only justified insofar as they may reduce the future incidence 
of crime and unhappiness.185 The utilitarian perspective of the trigger 
mechanism is thus somewhat conflicted.186 A broader triggering 
mechanism—along the lines of the three power model—would result 
in a maximum degree of jurisdiction.187 This is a negative in the sense 
that it may result in unnecessary prosecutions that are painful for in-
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dividuals and—more importantly—politically costly for states.188 The 
broader triggering mechanism of the three power model, for exam-
ple, may encourage more prosecutions than are absolutely necessary 
to deter aggression.189 Furthermore, by inviting political tensions into 
the international system, a broad triggering approach may well erode 
support for international institutions generally, thus countering any 
positive effects of deterrence.190 In this respect, the utilitarian per-
spective would appear to support the least costly, most politically ac-
ceptable approach: i.e., determinations made exclusively by the Secu-
rity Council.191 Able to protect themselves and their allies through the 
use of the veto, the permanent members of the Council will ensure 
that prosecutions proceed only when they do not pose any significant 
extrinsic cost to the system.192 
 However, according to the utilitarian perspective, the broader 
triggering mechanism is also a positive outcome because it maximizes 
the certainty of punishment for crimes, thus providing the most effi-
cacious deterrent to would-be aggressors.193 The narrower model, 
triggering prosecutions based only on an Article 39 determination of 
the Security Council, would inject a degree of uncertainty and impu-
nity into the system as each permanent member of the Council would 
be perceived as acting to shield its own citizens and those of its al-
lies.194 Would-be criminals would be invited to seek allies on the 
Council, precipitating the kinds of cat and mouse games that have 
plagued the Security Council in the post-Cold War era.195 Deterrence 
will be most effective if criminals are reasonably certain that they can-
not escape the Court’s jurisdiction through political maneuvering.196 
Following this rationale, the triggering mechanism should be vested 
as broadly as possible, providing maximum accountability.197 Thus, 
the pre-determination should not be vested solely in the Security 
Council, but should be made by any of the U.N. organs.198 
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 With regard to the definition of the crime, the utilitarian argues 
that a broader definition of the crime will not only prevent the clear 
cases of aggression, but will deter borderline cases as well.199 A strict 
definition of the crime will merely enable bad actors to conform their 
conduct to the strict requirements of the law, while contravening its 
spirit.200 A broader definition capable of incorporating the margins of 
the crime will deter more bad behavior.201 As Lord Simon wrote, “those 
who choose in such situations to sail as close as possible to the wind in-
evitably run some risk.”202 
 However, in addition to deterring blameworthy acts, a broader 
definition may also deter positive action.203 States may be less likely to 
commit peacekeepers, intervene in humanitarian disasters, or defend 
themselves against apparent threats if they perceive a risk of subse-
quently being labeled as aggressors.204 
 Furthermore, one of the many utilities cited for the criminal law 
is its value as an expressive vehicle.205 It thus serves a number of pur-
poses in affirming a shared moral code, in denouncing bad behavior, 
and in inculcating positive mores and habits.206 According to this ra-
tionale, the criminal law must serve some expressive purpose.207 But a 
criminal law that imprecisely defines the crime fails to identify or af-
firm any shared value.208 
 A retributivist would approach the question of definition from 
the requirement of notice.209 Would-be wrong-doers must have ade-
quate notice that their contemplated actions violate a social norm.210 
Failure to define the crime with adequate specificity criminalizes acts 
that are otherwise lawful and condemns law-conforming citizens who 
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have inadvertently crossed the line.211 While this principle of criminal 
law also serves a utilitarian goal—limiting the discretion of courts and 
enforcers212—its primary concern is the indefensibility of punishing 
individuals who have not made morally blameworthy choices.213 Thus, 
domestic courts have traditionally required a sufficient degree of 
specificity in the description of a crime.214 Without a morally blame-
worthy act, retributivists would deny the right of society to exact any 
retribution, even if it were to serve as a deterrent to others.215 Despite 
the preference of the Working Group for a general definition of the 
crime,216 this rationale would seem to support a narrower definition, 
stating clearly the nature and gravity of the prohibited acts.217 
 However, the retributive rationale focuses on the blameworthiness 
of the act and not on any artificial notion of technical specificity.218 Acts 
that are clearly blameworthy are punishable—indeed must be pun-
ished—even if they are not spelled out in minute detail or foreseen by 
the courts.219 This concern with punishing criminally blameworthy acts 
would appear to suggest a flexibility of definition.220 For example, the 
specificity of the clearly listed acts of Resolution 3314 provides the req-
uisite notice to would-be aggressors.221 Leaving the list open-ended so 
that evolving forms of the crime could be included—either by treaty or 
by prospective declaration of the ICJ—would provide the flexibility to 
capture evolving forms of aggression.222 
 By considering the crime of aggression in the light of both the 
utilitarian and retributivist rationales it becomes apparent that the ini-
tial determination of aggression must be vested broadly enough to 
maximize deterrence, yet narrowly enough to protect states from poli-
ticized prosecution.223 The ICJ is the ideal trigger.224 Unlike the two 
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political organs of the U.N. it is able to offer reasoned and demonstra-
bly apolitical decisions.225 And unlike the ICC itself it is an appropriate 
and indisputably competent forum to handle questions of a systemic 
international nature.226 In order to ensure the fairest jurisdictional 
reach, the ICJ opinion can, consistent with the U.N. Charter, itself be 
triggered by a request from either the Security Council or the General 
Assembly.227 This comports with both the utilitarian goal of maximizing 
deterrence and also the retributivist goal of minimizing impunity.228 
 In order to comport with statutory requirements and the apparent 
direction of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council should be vested 
with the primary responsibility for determining when aggression has 
occurred.229 However, if the Council proves unable to act, the General 
Assembly should be able to assume its duties.230 Both the Security 
Council and the General Assembly—by proxy—could either make the 
determination or refer the issue, as a procedural matter, to the ICJ.231 
There is no sound justification for making the determination of an ex-
ternal body binding on the ICC and the prosecution should itself be 
required to establish the act of aggression.232 However, since the ICJ 
offers a thorough discussion of the facts and reasoning of its decisions, 
a judicial referral may provide persuasive reasoning useful to the prose-
cution.233 
 The two rationales additionally provide some guidance in formu-
lating a justifiable definition of aggression.234 Retributivist principles 
require specificity in order to provide adequate notice to would-be 
aggressors that they are in danger of violating international criminal 
laws.235 Utilitarian analysis adds the value of deterring bad actors who 
would exploit a rules-based definition by the creation of a more flexi-
ble standard.236 Thus a specific definition, such as Resolution 3314, 
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with an open-ended list of illustrative acts would provide both the re-
quired notice and maintain the flexibility necessary to meet evolving 
forms of aggression.237 A prospective declaration by the ICJ that a par-
ticular act is aggressive would both deter similar conduct in the future 
and enjoin the actor from continued violation.238 
Conclusion 
 The crime of aggression is currently included in the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court, an increasingly relevant and useful 
institution in the international community. The Court’s jurisdiction 
over aggression, however, will only become effective once the member 
parties of the Court are able to agree on a definition of the crime. 
Among questions related to the problem, the Working Group on the 
Definition of Aggression has identified two main conceptual difficulties 
in reaching an accord: how the Court will know that aggression has oc-
curred between states, and how the definition describes the crime. The 
Working Group has already identified a number of options for a defini-
tion and offered thoughtful debate on both questions. But interna-
tional legal theorists have yet to analyze the potential crime in the light 
of the traditional justifications for criminal law. Analyzing the Working 
Group’s options in the light of utilitarian and retributivist principles 
yields a useful framework for analysis and offers helpful suggestions 
towards a principled solution. Allowing both the General Assembly and 
the Security Council to request an ICJ advisory opinion on the question 
of whether aggression has taken place accords with both the retributiv-
ist principles of accountability as well as utilitarian principles of deter-
rence and safety from political prosecution. Defining the crime specifi-
cally and providing an open-ended list of illustrative acts provides both 
the prerequisite moral guidelines of the retributivist as well as the flexi-
bility to deter new and evolving forms of aggression. 
 While it is yet unclear how well the crime may deter the act, the 
definition of the crime will almost certainly have a profound impact 
on international law itself. A working definition of aggression will as-
sert more than the mere criminality of the act; it will assert affirma-
tively, for the first time, that war is no longer an acceptable extension 
of statecraft, that nations are not powerless to punish, and that—even 
in the murky legality of the world order—the rule of law will not tol-
erate impunity for those who bring the world to the brink of war. 
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